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INFORMATION
AND BUILDING DEFECTS - WHY THEY HAPPEN AND HOW
TO AVOID THEM
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During the next ten years
and onwards, one of the dominant subjects in both
building research and information studies was to be the
alarming growth of expenditure on repairs and maintenance
(growing from 30% to 46% of the total expenditure in
building, between 1976 and 1986) and in particular the
prevalence of avoidable building failures and defects.
This
subject provided the stimulus for a two-year project,
begun in February 1978, on the selection and
specification of building materials and components,
carried out by the Institute of Advanced Architectural
Studies (IAAS), University of York, and sponsored by the
Building Centre Trust in association with other bodies.
The Preface to the Report [112],
published in May 1980, states that, in spite of improved
information supply and retrieval, "at the same time the
incidence of building failures remains high, often in the
simple construction of elements (e.g. flat roofs and
foundations), where published references to well-proven
and existing techniques are available. This problem has
been further complicated by the proliferation, in recent
years, of newly developed materials and components
[and] virtually no work has been done on
precisely how materials are specified, and on what basis
specifiers make their decisions [ - specifiers]
whose professional education rarely, until very recently,
included any training in the basic scientific properties
and behavior of materials."
The
first part of the Report deals in detail with how
undergraduate education covered the topic and as such is
not considered here. The second part discusses how
selection and specification is carried out in practice
and what procedures are adopted in a representative
sample of forty design offices. Office libraries were
found to be common, and fully-manned in the larger and
medium-sized offices; the smaller private practice
libraries were predominantly collections of trade
literature, backed up by British Standards, trade
association literature, "information such as that
published by The Architects’ Journal." The card
inquiry system (packs of pre-paid addressed cards to
manufacturers requesting their catalogues) was said to
have reduced the amount of unsolicited literature
[113].
The Report’s
findings showed much criticism of "badly compiled and
misleading trade literature" which was also criticized
for "extreme verbosity" and, more commonly, for giving
insufficient information. Opinions were divided on the
recent practice of including complete specification
clauses in trade literature. Complaints were made about
the lack of cost information, the rarity of test
information, and the lack of "common standards for
comparison of performance of products." There was a great
need for a published product guide "where comparisons
could be made between use, performance, dimensioning and
cost in areas where there is a wide range of components
available." In order of preference, the main sources of
technical information were said to be 1) trade
literature, 2) conversation with colleagues, and 3)
independent technical references. Note that throughout
the Report, some 221 pages long, with its wealth of
findings on how architects works, there is no mention of
BS 4940:1973.
Also in
1980, the BRE commissioned a study "to identify, describe
and analyze the design information currently available to
architects and other building designers in the UK." The
study, carried out by the Percy Thomas Partnership
[114],
was to be "complemented in particular by a parallel
project at the Institute of Advanced Architectural
Studies, on how designers make use of the information."
The main and underlying
aim was to help in the reduction of those building
failures identified as designers’ failures, a
significant proportion of which were in areas where
current information was (or should have been) readily
available, and also to help in the related marketing of
BRE knowledge. In other words, was building failure
caused by what may be termed ‘information
failure’, particularly the communication of research
findings?
One of the "areas for
initiative" was seen to be product information, which
"must strike most designers as the prime information
field of all." Product information appeared to be "weak
(a) as regards comparative data, and reviews of what is
available to assist in particular problem areas, and (b)
as regards the difficulty of maintaining up-to-date
information on costs and availability [...]" BS
4940 is called "the essential reference" but nothing is
said about its effectiveness, except to note that the AJ
Annual Review in 1980 indicated the trade catalogues
"which follow BS 4940 recommendations
exactly."
The
complementary and parallel research [115]
by IAAS was the first phase of a four-year study,
initiated in May 1980 by BRE and later jointly sponsored
with the Building Centre Trust, examining the
decision-making processes in live architectural design
projects.
The main aim of the first
phase was to investigate what information was used in the
early stages of the design of mostly small-scale domestic
building projects. The outcome was a strong indication
that designers tended to seek written information as a
‘last resort’, when their own experience or
that available in the office failed to provide an answer
to a problem. Seeking written information was seen as a
"time-consuming activity." The frequency of use of
written references was not related in any way to the
availability of a good library in the office.
When designers did use
written information, they consulted trade literature and
trade association publications. Straight-forward trade
literature was consulted to check on product sizes,
availability and performance criteria already determined
in the design; the literature rarely influenced the
choice of product but would influence the way the product
itself was used and detailed. Although the
manufacturers’ advice might not be considered
completely satisfactory, it was thought safest to follow
it in order to protect the designer’s liability. In
general, the research endorsed previous findings
[112,
113],
which led to recommendations for general improvement in
the standard of trade (and official) literature,
including its clarity and presentation. There is a note
of disappointment from the researchers that, despite the
earlier work, their recommendations had not been taken
up.
The
second and third phases of the IAAS study extended the
research into larger offices and into the later stages of
the design of a wider variety of building projects.
Special attention was given to the design of a single
element, namely: roofing. The findings of both phases of
the research were brought together in a final report
[116].
The underlying theme of the research and the resulting
recommendations was again the "growing concern that
ill-informed design accounts for a high proportion of
building defects. Designers in the study consulted
publications rarely, and often appeared to be unaware of
current sources of information." So designers needed help
in developing awareness of published information and in
how to handle data.
The
standard of performance of completed buildings was
evidently, according to the study, related to the
challenge of finding the right information at the right
time when there was so much available; meeting this
challenge was time-consuming and therefore was often
avoided. The report quotes from elsewhere "the building
industry can be said to be spending £630 million per
year in its failure to apply existing knowledge"
[117].
Manufacturers’ product and technical literature was
again found to be a major - and sometimes the only
mentioned - source of published information and was
"universally used in projects from detail design stage
onwards." Designers consulted trade literature not only
for choosing and evaluating particular products but also
for obtaining general principles of use for the product
type. Often a firm’s representatives would be called
in to supplement its written information with a
discussion of problems specific to a project
[118].
Conclusions to be drawn
from the research were that a major change of attitude
towards information handling and use was needed on the
part of designers and that this could most easily be
brought about by continuing professional development
(CPD) programs; equally, it was shown (a) that
publications needed to be improved to be more readily
used by designers and (b) that manufacturers, being the
main source, had the most potential for influencing the
quality of the information used.
There is
an abundance of still-pertinent recommendations given in
the report and these are listed individually for
designers, for those who educate them, and for producers
of technical information. Only a brief look at some of
them is possible here [119]:
- Designers are advised
to allow time for literature searching and reading and to
regard time so spent as worth-while "particularly where
greater study of a subject may prevent costly building
defects."
- Design
offices should have a person responsible for being
informed about current literature [120]
and should spend more on technical information and
information services.
- Office
libraries should have the right (welcoming) image and be
conducive to browsing. "Many offices would benefit from
having a librarian who participated in each project,
actively suggesting and seeking out information for the
designer. At present, only a few large practices have
such a librarian" [121].
-
Manufacturers were advised to provide comprehensive, easy
to find technical information in their literature which
should be presented according to the guidelines provided
by BS 4940:1973 and PSA’s Better Trade Literature
[122].
- Promotional material
should not be intermingled with technical information.
Meanwhile,
the battle against building failure and defects was being
waged on other fronts. The PSA commissioned and published
a practical book on common defects [123]
(comprising photographs supported by text) concentrating
on symptoms, diagnosis and remedies rather than on
fundamental causes. It was prompted by the high cost of
"the rectification of defects arising from errors in
design or construction, many of which could have been
avoided by better detailing or better workmanship." The
BRE series Defect Action Sheets and Defects News began in
1982 and dealt with common building defects in housing
and how to avoid them.
The
fundamental causes of building failure were diagnosed in
a widely publicized Report by the Research Strategy
Committee (RSC), established in late 1982 for the
Building and Civil Engineering Economic Development
Committees [124].
The starting point of the report was the failure of many
within the industry to recognize the process of
"[recent and continuing] change from a tradition
of craft skills to a technologically based industry."
Many new materials and products with unfamiliar
properties were being introduced significantly faster
than experience and feedback were being obtained.
The
Report notes that, with particular reference to housing
"there is practically no material or component used in
1985 that is identical with what was used in 1935" and
that up to about 1955 "almost all building and works were
constructed from a relatively small range of materials,
the appropriate use of which was well established over
long periods of time." Change had become revolutionary
rather than evolutionary. "The disastrous failures of new
buildings and other works of construction in recent years
demonstrate that changes in construction design, methods
and materials are taking place rapidly but with
substantially inadequate support from R and D"
[125].
Construction failures
were frequently due to the inadequacy of the technical
knowledge base and the transfer of such knowledge into
practice at all levels of the industry.
Another major change was
needed, this time in the attitude of the industry to R.
and D., defined as basic and applied research and
development. The modern construction industry, says the
report, cannot function effectively without an adequate
technological base from R. and D. A better R. and D.
knowledge base - covering, for example, durability and
performance for major new components and methods - was
essential if defects were to be avoided. As usual, a cost
estimate is provided. "Even a 1 percent reduction in
repairs and maintenance because of better construction
standards and improved durability would be a saving of
over £100 million a year."
The principal proposal of
the RSC was the setting up of a permanent construction
research Board, adequately financed by government and the
industry, to coordinate R. and D. funding and activities.
The Board would attempt to remedy the current R. and D.
deficiencies and effect a "substantial improvement in
technology transfer leading to a better use of
technological information by the industry, and in
particular that concerning ‘good
practice’."
One of the
responsibilities of the proposed research Board would be
to see that the industry was provided with a fast and
responsive information and advisory service. The report
points out that "currently, information and advice can be
obtained from a large number of organizations but there
is no central single body to which the industry and
clients can turn."
The vital importance of
improving the knowledge base meant that such an
information and advisory service (or services) should be
evolved in consultation with all the bodies already
providing a service, so that existing activity could be
coordinated and not duplicated.
After all the high level
policy proposals had been discussed, the recommendation
"those preparing technical information should make
greater use of BS 4940" came across as somehow rather
bathetic.
As further evidence in
support of the proposal, the RSC bravely picked out some
seventy trends likely to affect the construction industry
over the next decade, including in brief:
- the increasing
importance of repair, maintenance, improvement and
renewal of buildings;
- continuing defects and
increasing attention to their avoidance;
- increasing emphasis on
quality assurance (QA);
- development and use of
new materials, components and processes;
- transfer of site-based
processes to the factory with increased off-site
manufacture of better components;
- further fragmentation
of the industry;
- increasing use of
computers (and emerging use of robots) in design and
construction, and for information transfer;
- development of
alternative means of communicating information over long
distances between users, between disciplines and between
manufacturers, offices and sites;
- and the extension of
electronic information transfer.
A feeling of exasperation
clearly possessed by committee members burst out in one
of the trends listed,
- the
"growing effect of panic journalism on building failures
causing immediate and unpredictable changes of direction
in the industry" [126].
Although
there was general agreement with "the view that very
substantial sums of money are being spent annually
putting right faults which should not have occurred",
which prompted a 1982 BRE survey of quality in housing
[127],
there were varying estimates of how the blame should be
apportioned between architects (design faults),
contractors (bad workmanship) and manufacturers (product
faults). The BRE survey put 50 per cent of the blame on
architects, 40 per cent on contractors and only 10 per
cent on manufacturers.
Different
figures are given in the NEDO report which states that
"Studies indicate that about 50 per cent of faults
originate in the design office, about 30 per cent on the
site and about 20 per cent in materials", although the
discrepancy may be due to interpretation of the BRE
analysis [128].
These
figures were challenged two years later by the results of
a survey, commissioned by the Association of Building
Component Manufacturers (ABCM), "to establish how
building defects can be reduced through the use of
improved technical documentation and what can be done to
promote better communication of high quality technical
information between manufacturers, architects, specifiers
and contractors." The report [129]
left no room for doubt: "responsibility for building
defects can now be shown to rest with the three
respondent groups as follows: manufacturers 26%,
architects 33% and contractors 41%."
In
general, the findings of the survey and analysis do not
otherwise differ greatly from those of previous reports.
As a source of information, manufacturers’
publications are still ‘top of the list’,
despite criticism of contents [130];
manufacturers needed to pay much more attention to their
technical information, particularly to unsubstantiated
performance claims, which should be kept separate from
sales literature; and there was a need for comparative
data on products.
But there is now much
more emphasis on the lack of awareness by architects and
contractors of quality assurance, i.e. BS 5750 (quality
management systems) and BS 5760 (guidelines for the
reliability of constructed or manufactured products,
systems, equipment and components). Interestingly,
manufacturers scored far better with both standards;
three-quarters of the respondents had read and
implemented BS 5750, while only 36% had read BS 4940.
Meanwhile, the use of BRE Defects Action Sheets was low,
and there was support for an "independent data bank of
legal and technical data on building defects" and for a
periodical on those topics.
The Percy Thomas
Partnership Report [114] contains the pertinent,
if rather obvious, observation that "the only information
that is sure to be used is - information that it is
mandatory to apply [and] - information that is
unavoidably related to the supply of a product."
It is
true that the possibility of legal action is far more
likely to persuade a manufacturer or supplier to exercise
great care in describing a product than any
recommendations from a well-meaning committee. However,
the finding of the NEDO report [124]
that so many in the industry were even unaware that their
knowledge was not up to date elicited the legal comment
[131]
that "the implications in terms of negligence liability
are obvious! [...] but if the NEDO strategy is
not followed, there are serious questions for the future
of those who will want to resort to
‘state-of-the-art’ defenses in negligence
actions" because new materials and methods were being
introduced significantly faster than experience and
feedback was being obtained.
The Trades Descriptions
Act 1968, to which BS 4940:1973 drew attention, made
giving a false or misleading description to a product or
a service a criminal offense, punishable by a fine or
imprisonment or both. In the Act,
‘Descriptions’ embraced quantity, size,
composition, performance, testing and approvals.
After
the UK joined the European Economic Community (popularly
known as the Common Market, now called the European
Union), Directives from that source would give rise to
real national legislation. The Community’s Product
Liability Directive of July 1985 (No. 85/374/EEC) was
incorporated into English law by the Consumer Protection
Act 1987, coming into force on 1 March 1988
[132].
In
general terms, the Act covers the right of action by
anyone suffering injury, death or damage to property
against the original manufacturer or supplier of a
defective product, without the need to prove negligence.
Thus, consumers had new protection against suppliers of
defective products and greater responsibility was placed
on manufacturers to ensure the quality and high standards
of what they produced. However, according to one
commentator [133]
"the principal legislation regarding defective products
is still probably the Sale of Goods Act 1979
[...]" He goes on to say that no manufacturer
deliberately makes substandard products - which usually
happens due to lack of organization or effective
preventive procedures and which could be obviated by
implementing a quality management system based on BS
5750. The "marked improvement" in manufacturers’
technical literature over the past twenty years is noted,
but common faults [134]
still persist.
The EC Construction
Product Directive (89/106/EEC) (CPD) came into force on
27 June 1991 and was implemented in the UK by the
Construction Products Regulations 1991 (S.I. 1991/1620).
The Directive had the objective of standardizing (or
‘harmonizing’) EC Member States’ product
safety standards. The Regulations make it an offense to
supply a construction product for incorporation in a
permanent manner in buildings unless it is fit for its
intended use and satisfies the relevant ‘essential
requirements’. The six essential requirements relate
to
- mechanical resistance
and stability;
- safety in case of fire;
- hygiene, health and the
environment;
- safety in use;
- protection against
noise;
- and
energy economy and heat retention [135].
Manufacturers would have
to ensure that their products met the requirements by
choosing a route to EC technical approval, most probably
by obtaining an EC (or CE) mark for each product. The
procedures for achieving certification of conformity are
set out in the Regulations.
The
effect of the CPD was that UK manufacturers "will have to
take a closer look at their product literature
[because] mistakes in any product and technical
literature could prove very expensive"
[136].
Any future recommendations on product trade literature
would need to take into account the European Directives
and Quality Assurance generally.
On 15 July 1983, BSI
wrote to the members of, and organizations represented
on, its Sub-Committee on Building Trade Literature saying
that after ten years the review of BS 4940 was due. On
the basis of the options chosen in the seven replies
received, the decision was made to revise the standard
rather than withdraw it, declare it obsolete or confirm
it with or without amendment. Astonishingly, in view of
the developments over the previous ten years, two replies
opted for confirmation without amendment! Since the
disappointing effect of the Standard must have been known
to the surviving members of the Sub-Committee, it would
seem that hope had once again triumphed over experience.
The outcome might be different had it been foreseen that
the Sub-Committee would still be meeting ten years later.
If
the 1973 Standard was one of the quickest ever produced,
the revised version was to prove to be probably the
slowest. By May 1984, a new Sub-Committee drawn initially
from thirteen organizations had been constituted and its
first meeting was held a month later
[137].
If the previous drafting committee had been considered by
its Chairman to be "widely representative" and by a
member to be "certainly [...] a Panel which fully
represented the industry", the same could not be said of
the new Committee, to the disappointment of the new
Chairman [138].
It was largely composed of users and purveyors of trade
literature, with little or no input from manufacturers.
The previous consultant was co-opted onto the
Sub-Committee and later officially appointed to prepare
the draft through the DoE/PSA Code Consultancy Scheme
[139].
One of the first actions
of the Sub-Committee was to change its name to
‘Building Technical Information’ to indicate
that its scope covered all forms of technical
documentation (except project or contract documents) and
also computer databases.
Some
principles which would govern the revision of the
Standard began to be confirmed, for example that
simplification was required, the complications of
‘main’ and ‘part’ documents removed,
it should be much easier to read and understand, and the
tone should not be peremptory. The CIB Master List would
form an integral part of the Standard, which would as far
as possible be self-sufficient and not need any
supplementary or explanatory publication like Better
Trade Literature [140].
But most important of all
was the resolution that the Standard would be exemplary -
that is, it must be in the form in which it was advising
others to produce their literature. This would include
the use of color printing, reproduction of photographs
and the use of what was called "a more varied
typographical orchestra." All this would mean a radical
departure from the dreary regulation BSI house style. A
dispensation was with difficulty eventually
obtained.
The Sub-Committee
included a representative from BRE and this was most
opportune because that organization was concerned that
its own technical publications were not having the
desired impact on building practitioners, and that
building failure and lack of quality might be due, in
part, to communications failures.
The BRE research program
on information transfer in the construction industry
included giving practical guidance, based on the analysis
of users’ problems, on structuring and presenting
information, and developing prototype publications and
testing them on practitioners. The research team was
interested in ‘readability’ (as distinct from
legibility), and on such matters as type size, line
length, spacing and margins.
Members
of the BRE Design and Communications Division gave an
illustrated presentation to the Sub-Committee in April
1985 of relevant research findings on information-seeking
behavior, targeting information [141]
and document design. The presenters put forward the
debatable view that architects and other users of trade
publications "are unlikely to read BS 4940, so they
should not influence its form. But as readers of
documents which use the recommendations of BS 4940, they
should certainly influence its content."
[142].
This BRE involvement proved most beneficial throughout
the preparation of the revised Standard.
If the
members of the Sub-Committee were not already aware that
the existing BS 4940 after more than twelve years of
diminishing effectiveness was now almost moribund, it was
brought home to them by some forceful comments
[143]
by the Assistant Director of Architecture, Greater London
Council (GLC). Asked to be a judge for an award for trade
literature, he had decided to take a closer look at some
examples - twelve received in one day - to see how they
followed BS 4940. He reported that the result was
"staggering", and concluded that "the overriding
impression is that the technical side of a company
produces information which is then worked on by the
marketing office - the result is a mish mash of
half-digested information which once published and
distributed usually ends up in the waste paper bin."
Another
survey [144]
a year later gave a different view from specifiers. This
survey, commissioned by the publishers of
Morgan-Grampian, of the attitude of specifiers towards
technical literature and the part it played in the
specifying and selection process was undertaken because
"very little survey data exists." Some of the results
confirmed in general those of the earlier York IAAS
studies. According to the Report, the quality of
technical literature had a strong influence in
specification, about a quarter of the publications
received - eight or nine a week - were filed and these
were considered of high quality. Once again performance
data was shown not to be taken at face value.
The
regular trade products columnist in Building
[145]
drew the attention of manufacturers to the office
librarian who is responsible for collecting trade
literature. The librarians should be remembered since
they commend to architects products they have not seen,
on the basis of literature in the library. Therefore they
must be told if a product has an Agrément
Certificate (one of the "staggering" omissions noted
elsewhere [143]) and if any supportive technical
information is available in the company.
Other
common faults are noted. The author of the survey
concludes: "there is no doubt that the quality of British
technical literature would be higher if librarians were
more involved and manufacturers would do well to consult
them even at the briefing stage" [146].
Another
one of the "staggering" facts noted [143]
was the absence of publication dates from technical
literature; only one of the twelve examples commented on
by the Assistant Director of Architecture, GLC, had a
date. A member of the Sub-Committee made his own analysis
and found that of 116 publications examined (dealing with
concrete blocks, gas heating appliances and heat pumps),
47 had no dates, 28 had dates which were hard to find,
and only 41 were clearly dated. The later analysis of 21
publications (on drainage and rainwater pipes) scored
much better with 17 having dates [147].
That
the date of issue should be printed on product and
technical literature was considered of supreme importance
by most users. For example, the 88 replies to a BRE
questionnaire distributed to CIIG members in 1986 asking
how they rated thirteen attributes of product/technical
information showed that every respondent except one
marked ‘date of issue’ as essential
[148].
In a survey commissioned by BRE in 1987 on the use of
technical information by designers, the majority said
that the date of issue and a summary were the most
important features [149].
To help the Sub-Committee
in its work, the DoE agreed to fund a research project,
managed by BRE and carried out jointly by York IAAS and
BCT, to find out from manufacturers the extent of their
awareness of the need to provide resources for the
production of good trade literature, the extent to which
the producers of good trade literature did so by
following BS 4940 recommendations, and to assess the
implications of the findings for the planned revision of
the Standard. The methodology uses was postal
questionnaires (1000 sent out, 359 replies), group
discussions, evaluation of examples of trade literature
against BS 4940, and personal appraisal of individual
pieces of trade literature by a panel of architects,
engineers, estimators, buyers, specifiers and
librarians.
The
research found [150]
that at the level where policy and budgets were set,
manufacturers had no awareness of the importance of good
trade literature - it was regarded as a "necessary evil"
- and there was little understanding of how it was used.
Decisions on trade literature were mainly made by middle
managers associated with sales, who tended to contract
out part of the process of literature production, often
to advertising agencies. If there was a very low level of
awareness of BS 4940 (almost two-thirds of respondents
were ignorant of it) there was an even lower level of
compliance. Many of the reasons given for ignoring the
Standard by those aware of its details would not have
surprised the Sub-Committee:
- it restricted
creativity, flair, ingenuity and attention-gaining
efforts;
- it did not complement
the house-style;
- it was out of touch
with modern presentation;
- it was difficult to
follow;
- it was too detailed and
complex;
- it failed to cover
everything;
- it produced bland,
uninteresting, stereotyped literature.
The
panel evaluated 293 publications, fewer than 45% of which
scored against the BS 4940 requirements on such matters
as dating, numbering, illustrations, sequence of
information, contents lists and indexes. In spite of
these failings, the panel considered most literature as
‘adequate’. The researchers commented that it
was difficult to define ‘good technical
literature’ and "what we cannot demonstrate is that
a failure to follow BS 4940 necessarily leads to poor
technical literature". The Management Summary
[151]
of the study stated "the main conclusions are that the
existence of BS 4940 has lost its impact and as a result,
its influence, over the years; it is no longer seen to be
essential to the production of good technical
literature."
The revised BS 4940 was
eventually published in January 1994. The Sub-Committee
had studied, as it was briefed to do, all the relevant
reports and other evidence of the previous ten years.
A
number of frustrating delays [152]
marked the last few years before the final draft was
approved for publication [153].
A last-minute attempt by the production side of BSI to
renege on the dispensation and publish in the usual
format on the ground that it "would be difficult to use
in an electronic database" was speedily overcome.
The
three pages of the original 1946 British Standard 1311
had increased to three separately published parts, each
carefully called a Guide, under a new general title
Technical Information on Construction Products and
Services. It was almost an exemplary document following
the maxim "A Good Example is the Best Sermon"
[154]:
- Part 1
of the revised Standard is a guide for management to
planning the production of technical information about
products and services, listing the tasks to be undertaken
and giving advice on planning, budgeting, staffing and
the employment of consultants [155].
It applies to all kinds of technical publications from
simple data sheets to complex works in several volumes.
-
Part 2 is a guide to the information that different types
of document should contain and its arrangement,
emphasizing the importance of providing full and accurate
information [156].
It recommends that for ease of reference and comparison,
information should be set out on the model of the CIB
Master List [157].
The use of approved quality and safety marked is
explained.
- Part 3 is a guide to
presentation and describes the principles that should be
followed in designing a publication, covering format and
binding, page layout, illustrations and color,
typography, printing, storage, distribution and
updating.
A
half-day seminar to promote the revised Standard was held
in March 1994 at the RIBA headquarters in London, jointly
arranged by RIBA Information Services, BSI and BMP. All
the talks were aimed directly at manufacturers, giving
"practical guidance on making sure that your literature
meets the information needs of specifiers." There was no
product manufacturer among the platform speakers. In the
first part of the program, on the need for structured
technical literature, two speakers, an architect and a
design director, gave their views, followed by a lively
presentation by two librarians conveying the message
"produce good trade literature and your company could be
in each architect’s office every day, on the library
shelves." In the second part, speakers from the BSI
Sub-Committee explained how BS 4940 can provide a
coherent strategy for good technical literature
[158].
Following
the publication of the revised BS 4940, attempts were
made to initiate the production of an international
version. The CIB Draft Recommendations for Trade
Literature (1977) had been rendered obsolete since it was
largely based on the superseded BS 4940 and intended to
be used with the Master List, also now revised. A joint
CIB/UICB publication similar to Better Trade Literature
was proposed and a draft prepared [159]
but this attempt failed. There has been little
development to date on a proposal originally submitted to
ISO in 1995 [160]
for an ISO Guide to technical information for
construction products, to include electronic exchange of
information, although an ISO Working Group has been
established [161].
This narrative has been
written in a sprit of exploration and is not intended to
reach pre-determined conclusions; nevertheless some
general observations might be allowed:
- In spite of all the
expressed anxiety about the omnipresence of factory-made
building products and the industrialization of building
sites, people with mastery of a craft or a trade are
still required in the industry. Indeed, the demand for
such people has in recent years increased, with the
concern for the preservation and restoration of the
national heritage of historic, or simply old, buildings.
Nowadays they may use power tools or even electronic
devices but they are prized for their personal skills,
knowledge and experience. And the architect still
exercises traditional art and imagination to create, as
ever, good, bad and indifferent buildings
- The same complaints
about the shortcomings of trade literature have been
constantly repeated for more than half a century. This
seems to indicate that the advice and recommendations
offered by architects, researchers, librarians, members
of committees and others have not been noticed or have
been ignored by a significant proportion of
manufacturers. The improvement in trade literature
discerned by some commentators was probably real, but not
widespread and probably evanescent. Trade literature
remained, nevertheless, the prime source of technical
information.
- The pride and prejudice
of the manufacturers was matched by that of the users of
their trade literature, neither appreciating the problems
of the other. When presenting their products in the
market-place, the priorities of the manufacturers, so far
as trade literature was concerned, were not necessarily
those of their potential customers. The idea of
segregating ‘sales’ from ‘technical’
information completely would seem to them to be contrary
to sensible marketing. Conformity to a complicated,
non-mandatory Standard, perceived to be stultifying, was
not high on their list of ways of selling their products.
- There was little
consensus about what makes trade literature
‘good’. The manufacturers’ view was that
‘good’ literature was that which sold the
product [150].
The architects’ view found trade literature
acceptable if it gave them all the information they
needed in a manner which made comparisons possible.
Attempts to reconcile the two views by suggesting that
"good literature means good business [and] helps
to sell the product" failed to impress.
-
Various reasons were given by designers as to why they
consulted trade literature: to check such matters as
product sizes, availability, and performance criteria
already decided on in the design; to learn about a
product type and its installation; but rarely simply to
select a product. A magisterial view was that "although
good technical information may persuade designers and
other to choose a product, this is not its purpose. In an
ideal market of good information, no choice would be
possible. I suggest that the purpose is to aid selection
and accurate specification on purely technical grounds"
[162].
- The
widest gap between the manufacturer and the designer was
on the importance of providing technical information in
trade literature in a way which allowed for comparison
with similar products from other manufacturers. Extolling
the virtue of BS 4940:1973 a speaker said "for the first
time their products and services stand a fair chance of
being compared" [163]
- assuming that all manufacturers would follow the
recommendation. Manufacturers prefer their products to be
judged on their own merits and not in comparison with
others!
An
attempt to narrow the gap was begun in 1983 with an
Approved Building Product Scheme, but failed. A second
attempt - a Product Design review - sought a "way of
allaying the impartiality of worthy bodies, such as BSI
and the Agrément Board, with the seductiveness of
manufacturers’ literature." By simple rules, the
role of a product field would be surveyed and reduced to
15 to 20 firms; these firms and their products would be
reviewed by an expert Panel and the results, with
agreement, published. Comparison and selection would be
quick and easy for the designer. Two prototype Reviews
were produced but the scheme failed to attract sufficient
manufacturers [164].
To bring the two sides together seems impossible and thus
the intermediary - the producer of such aids as data
sheets and periodical reviews such as those in The
Architects’ Journal and Building Design’s
‘EasyGuides’ - is essential.
-
Reports, said Florence Nightingale, are not
self-executive. Many of the proposals put forward in the
reports described were based on ideas rather than realism
and they demanded funding from official sources or from
the industry. Proposals such as the establishment of a
central databank of commodity information
[165]
and a central construction advisory and information
service, for example, would never be implemented by
governments which rejected public service values and
which put their faith in market forces. Governments of
other persuasions would find their own reasons for
rejecting such proposals. The industry would also need
leadership from some properly funded central body and all
the possible candidates for such a role, NBA, PSA, NEDO,
BRE were abolished or sold off to the private sector.
- A lot of time and
intellectual effort was expended on research and surveys.
Too much of this work tended to replicate findings that
had been reported already, beyond acceptable
confirmation. The research and surveying activities were
as uncoordinated as the building process itself was
accused of being.
- A Standard, British or
international, is not the best vehicle for giving advice
to manufacturers on their trade literature. This has been
pointed out be researchers and by manufacturers - a Guide
to literature production rather than a Standard may be
more acceptable to, and more widely used by them
[150].
Internationally, a guide produced by UICB, possibly in
cooperation with CIB, would have more chance of being
effective than an ISO standard.
- It seems ironic that
the recommendations of the 1973 version of BS 4940
applied specifically to "printed documents" (although
microfiche had been approved for organizing information)
when the Standard was part of a program of a computing
committee. The revised version, published well into the
computer age was also "limited to information in the form
of print on paper." This may have been prudent at a time
when a survey reported (in 1986) that "whatever criticism
of technical literature may exist, its future in print,
as opposed to on-computer, is assured. Very few
respondents either had or intended to acquire a computer
for storing technical data. About half of the sample
welcomed computerization, but half were strongly in favor
of the printed word as the right medium for technical
literature" [144].
It is very doubtful if this is true today although a
recent building trade catalogue service on CD-ROM put the
catalogue pages on screen to be turned in the normal way.
Whether any trade
literature will continue to be produced in printed form
in the distant future is a matter of speculation; what is
certain is that the immediate future for product
information is with the Internet.