MODEL POST DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, (CASE OF EL NINO EMERGENCY PROJECT– KENYA)

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Abstract

Following El Nino phenomena that occurred between November 1997 and March 1998, heavy rainfall all over the country caused floods that impacted thirty-five of the seventy-six administrative districts and the provincial city of Nairobi – Kenya. Many parts of the country were isolated due to transport system failure, and many essential services such as water supplies and health facilities were destroyed. There was loss of human lives and thousands of households were displaced.

After the floods, there was an immediate need for emergency reconstruction works for vital infrastructure such as health services, water supplies, roads and bridges. The recovery funds were given by the World Bank, African Development Bank and Agense Franscaise de Developpement. A reconstruction management team was set-up in the Office of the President comprising private sector professionals under the special program, Project Management Unit (PMU). The management unit recorded a considerable reduction of implementation time and cost compared to normal project implementation procedures. This management system proved easily adoptable in any disaster situation for provision of immediate needs as well as the long-term reconstruction programs. This paper explores the operational systems that were adopted by the project management unit in the implementation of El Nino Emergency Projects as a basis of post disaster reconstruction model in third world countries.

Keywords: Post Disaster; Reconstruction; El-Nino Phenomenon; Project Management Unit; Kenya.

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INTRODUCTION

Weather experts blamed El Nino for abnormal rainfall which caused widespread flooding (DEP, 1998). Approximately 86 human deaths were caused by floods, cattle perished by drowning and thousands lost their homes. Lifeline facilities were destroyed, bridges and roads damaged, cutting off many parts of the country. 124 000 refugees in Dadaab refugee camps in the northeastern Kenya were totally isolated (WFP, 1997) from the rest of the country from mid October 1997. Food and other essential goods were unable to reach northeastern part of the country. In western Kenya, people fleet and took shelter in churches, schools and market centers. The overall effects was reduced crop production, high animal mortality rates (Ndikumana et al., 2000) due to cases of Rift Valley Fever (RVF), which affected both animal and human populations. In general El Nino phenomenon adversely affected food production and distribution, damaged food in the farms and stores. According to FAO (1998) report, the worst affected included the Coast Province, North Eastern Province and parts of the Eastern Province, as shown on the map below, these areas were declared the disaster zone by the Kenya Government which appealed for international assistance to cope with emergency.



Figure 1: Map showing the severely flood affected area in Kenya (Source: World Bank Report on El Nino Emergency Project – Kenya).

El Nino also caused outbreak of Rift Valley Fever (RVF), Cholera and Malaria (CARE, 1998). RVF killed approximately 300 people. The impact of La Nina phenomena which followed El Nino almost immediately made the situation worse especially incases of food production (Webber, 1998). According to Sandrasaga (2000), Kenya was one of the harshly affected countries during the 1997/1998 El Nino event. The report stated that global damage wreaked by this event was estimated at between $36 and $96 billion.

MANAGEMENT OF EL NINO

According to the joint report of UN agencies, Sandrasagra (2000), the major problem involving the response of El Nino event in many countries studied was rivalries among government agencies which create needless delays and problems in reconstruction. The report strongly recommended that each country should create a single agency to coordinate El Nino-related disaster response and preparation. Traditional government practices in many developing countries encompass tedious paperwork and a chain of signatures, which in reconstruction stage, may result to deterioration of the status of the affected society and possible loss of life. In cases where the reconstruction efforts are managed by civil society, there lacks accountability, implementation capacity and professionalism in execution of the works, further to that the close monitoring and evaluation score is usually low. Therefore there is need to have a more elaborate institutional management model which can be easily adoptable in any functional management structure that will ensure timely execution of the reconstruction works, efficient utilization of available resources and quality output.

Basis for Initiation of El-Nino Emergency Project (ENEP)

The El Nino Emergency Project (ENEP) was to support government efforts to mitigate the serious effects of flooding attributed to the El Nino phenomenon. The project aimed to minimize life threatening condition in 35 impacted districts of Kenya and the province of Nairobi by restoring as much of the previously existing potable water supply and health facilities as possible, and to facilitate economic activity through the restoration of key routes into cut off areas. It was also to save economic assets in danger of total collapse such as bridges. Following the disaster assessment and community prioritization exercise which involved those impacted by the flooding, the components that required rehabilitation were: emergency rehabilitation of infrastructure which included rural roads and bridges, water supplies and health facilities; and institutional support, that included engineering consulting services for design and construction supervision. The project was exempted from all taxes and duties under special legislation enacted by the Government of Kenya (GoK). The projects' selection criteria was as stated in Table 1.

MANUAL OF PROCEDURES (MoP)

The broad scope services of the PMU technical staff were contained in the Manual of Procedures (MoP), which was prepared and agreed upon between the financing agencies and the Government of Kenya (GoK). The implementation arrangements was developed to minimize the administrative procedures related to contracting and payments which included the Special Emergency Fund (SEF), where the minister of finance established a special emergency fund which was to be provided with funds by GoK and participating donors (World Bank - IDA, Africa Development Bank - AfDB, and Agence Francaise de Developpment – AFD), and to be used to finance approved sub-projects, based on the application of agreed criteria and operating procedures contained in the MoP. The fund was to be operated as a special fund, separate from on-going GoK programs.

Project Organogram

The figure below is the management structure and table 2 outlines the responsibilities of various authorities that were involved in the El Nino Emergency project implementation.





Figure 2: The management structure for the El Nino Emergency Project – Kenya.

Implementation Arrangement, Accountability Mechanisms and Checks

To ensure that the project supports and sustains priority sub-projects/activities, participation of relevant stakeholders was initiated for the purpose of identification, planning and execution, and maintenance of the sub-projects/activities. The participation was achieved by building on existing arrangements at the district/community levels. This also ensured that funds were effectively utilized; and it was achieved through DDC and community committees.

The implementation scheme for ENEP was based on other similar operations tried and tested in West Africa for the carrying out of minor public works through contracting out, and was adopted to the Kenya situation to ensure it functions effectively. The principal difference between the Kenya approach and the approach used in West Africa was the location of the PMU in the office of the president (in West Africa, the PMU were private sector agencies). Delegation of authority to the PMU by the steering committee for procurement and contract awards and other implementation tasks with very rigorous audits of the project's management and its results on the ground.

Local participation was assured through the District Disaster Committees (DDC), which comprised of stakeholders from GoK, local authorities and community members. These communities were also involved in drawing up the indicative emergency program. They were also involved in verifying priorities, in generating new projects and in environmental assessment studies after the PMU was established. Further to that, they were involved in checking on contracted works, as they were furnished with copies of the contracts for works done in their districts and were guaranteed by the PMU access to work sites. General public scrutiny of the project was accomplished through regular publication of the indicative work program, public advertising of tenders and role of the results of the bidding process, publication of the project audit reports, and public inquiries in the event of serious deviation from the expected norms.

The PSC approved the annual ruling indicative work program and changes to it and also approved the administrative budget of the PMU based upon the work program. The PSC was meeting at least once a month to check the progress and more frequently at the behest of the project manager. Since most ENEP

rehabilitation works was done in the Northeast and Coast region, two units of the PMU was located there (with technical units based in Mombassa and Garissa) and manned entirely by consultants (with inputs and monitoring by the GoK technical staff). The PMU and one Technical Unit (TU) were based in Nairobi. Any deviation from MoP was to be cleared by the PSC and then approved by the International Development Association (IDA). This model, that had been tested in West Africa, and adopted to Kenya needs, provided strong assurance that the ENEP works will be done speedily, efficiently, and transparently.

Procurement

The MoP laid out detailed instruction to be followed by the PMU for procurement of all works, consultants' services and goods. Award of the contract up to a certain threshold required the approval of the PSC but subject to prior IDA review procedures. While contracts up to a basic threshold value was directly awarded by the PMU. Contracts of lower values were procured on basis of quotations or shopping.

Environment and Project Risks

During implementation the supervision of environmental aspects and likely mitigation measures formed part of routine work. The main risks were that, it was uncertain whether the special implementation arrangements will work, as there was a shift from normal practices and a potential threat to vested interest in the then existing system. The risks were addressed through clear roles and responsibilities of the PSC, PMU and the pivotal role of the Project Manager and district-level committees/beneficiaries, periodic technical, management and physical audits and close supervision of the works.

Factors that Affected Implementation

There were external factors outside the control of governance and implementing agency, such as ethnic conflicts and banditry that hindered work progress. The GoK was reluctant to abide by certain terms of the agreements reached during credit negotiations such as; selection of project management staff; relationship between the PMU and PSC; and issues relating to the seconding staff. There were also marked delays caused by infrequent replenishment of Special Accounts (SA), thus, delays in payments to contractors and consultants. Delays were also noted in the transfer of funds from the SA to the Project Accounts and remarked delay was noted to start the overall projects implementation. Other factors were: exchange losses due to conversion of currency from one currency unit to another accompanied by cumbersome transactions; in certain instances, the OP and PSC became involved in with the management issues of the project, contrary to stipulated procedure, making the PMU's responsibility and authority unclear at times.

Achievements of the Project

The project demonstrated that streamlined procurement and payment procedures improved the efficiency of project implementation, and that some of these procedures might be adopted in any management institution in the reconstruction phase of a disaster as a mainstream project implementation practices. The overall performance of the PMU's management of the project was rated highly satisfactory. Delivered 116 IDA financed civil works contracts and 26 AfDB financed civil works contracts within a three-year period. Significant reductions in turn-around times for the procurement of consultancy services and civil works contracts were realized. The performance indicators for projects implemented under the ENEP and achievements are contained in table 3.

The average amount of time it took to sign contracts from the time of advertising the civil works bids was reduced from over 400days for conventional procurement process by Kenya Urban Transportation Infrastructure Projects (KUTIP) to just under 200 days for El Nino Emergency Projects (ENEP), this is illustrated from the table below. The Reduction of the length of time to affect payments to the contractors and consultants were realized. Average payment turn around times for ENEP were reduced from 60 days for KUTIP to 44 days under the ENEP management.

Table 4: Comparison of turn around time from bids advertisement to contract award for KUTIP and ENEP contracts

No.	***Project Sector***	***Number of Contracts***	***Average No. of Days from Contract Advertisement to Award***
1.	KUTIP Urban Roads	11	409
2.	ENEP Urban Roads	8	197
3.	ENEP Rural Roads	23	195
4.	ENEP Water Supply	27	193
5.	ENEP Water Supplemental	6	54
6.	ENEP Health Facilities	47	231
7.	ENEP Health Facilities Supplemental	9	57

The physical output realized under the El Niño Emergency Project (ENEP),included both rural and urban road networks, water supplies, health facilities and related goods aimed at restoring the livelihood of the affected persons. Table 5 gives the summary of what was accomplished under the program.

Table 5: Summary of the physical output of the El Nino Emergency Project (ENEP)

No.	***Components***	***Output under IDA Financing***	***Output under AfDB Financing***
1.	Civil Works:		
	1. Rural Roads & Bridges	23 contracts 1,634 km of roads and numerous bridges and drifts rehabilitated	11 contracts
	2. Water Supply	31 contracts 45 water supplies rehabilitated	13 contracts
	3. Health Facilities	54 contracts 112 health facilities rehabilitated	Not covered
2.	Goods	2 contracts for water supply chemicals and equipment plus numerous office equipment and vehicles small contracts.	2 contracts for water supply chemicals and equipment plus several office equipment and vehicles small contracts
3.	Consulting Services	10 major consultancy services contracts including audit	IDA financed
4.	Operating Costs	3 professional staff to manage the project plus other office support such as rent and traveling costs	Not covered
5.	Civil works for Urban roads under KUTIP	8 contracts 67 km of urban roads rehabilitated or reconstructed	

Monitoring and Evaluation

Quarterly financial and technical audits were required to be carried out by an independent professional accounting firm. At various time over the period of three years of implementation, technical and financial issues were identified by the audit firm and brought to the attention of the PMU and International Development Association (IDA) for resolution and improvement in the management of the identified contracts. Through this extra layer of quality control, the consulting services were improved and the quality of the infrastructure constructed under the civil works contracts was kept to a high standard for all the 116 IDA civil works contracts. Three consultancy contracts were awarded in the final year of implementation of the project to further independently assess the social impacts of the project investments and the quality of the works constructed. There were therefore four layers of checks on the quality of the contracts: the PMU; their consultants – the zonal Technical Units (TUs); the audit firm; and the monitoring and evaluation consultants. The DDC and community groups also provided monitoring in their respective areas

on regular basis. The bank supervision mission also regularly visited the contract sites on a random basis to confirm and verify the information provided from various other layers of supervision.

Suitability of PMU Model

Although direct PMU organizational model structure may not be particularly recommended as a general institutional model, the more efficient delivery of outputs it attained makes it worthy to be replicated within any other formalized contracts delivery institutional framework by simply modifying existing procedures.

Practices to be Emulated

At the operational level, in order to respond to the urgent nature of the assistance required, both the GoK and the World Bank adjusted their standard practices for the implementation and financing of the emergency project. The establishment of the PMU and the PSC proved to be successful, which can be emulated where organizational structures cannot allow public sector reforms, or where the reform process is time consuming and may result in delay for the reconstruction process. The rationale of placing a single centralized PMU within OP was related to the urgent nature of the response time required and not the multi-sectoral dimensions of the interventions. The PMU was allowed to function with streamlined procurement and payment procedures contrary to if it had been placed under the government structure. The open and competitive recruitment of the 3 project management staff from outside the public civil service contributed most significantly to the improved project management and timely output of ENEP; good project management practices. The function of the PSC as an executive body to oversee the functioning of the project management can be replicated in any disaster management structure for efficient administration.

In order to hasten the implementation of the ENEP, it was agreed during project preparation that certain procurement and financial/payment procedures would have to be streamlined within the GoK systems in order to meet the agreed upon implementation schedules. The PMU was given powers to clear all procurement contracts below a given threshold while larger contracts had to obtain approval of the PSC before an award of contract could be made. This allowed quick procurement system. This functional procurement procedure can be set-up in the disaster reconstruction phase to ensure speedy implementation of the reconstruction program. In Kenya this procurement procedure has already been factored into the legislation for Public Procurement procedure and have registered considerable time reduction in the procurement process. Under the ENEP, the PMU was given an Authority to Incur Expenditure (AIE), this

reduced the turn-around time for payments and it helped greatly in ensuring that payments were made on time to various consultants and contractors; most projects recorded approximately 50% of the time it took for projects financed under KUTIP. This was facilitated by reduced number of steps required in order to authorize and make payments stipulated in normal government practices.

Since the reconstruction works involve a large number of operations taking place at a time, several layers of quality control should be set out to ensure that works are carried out with high standards in order for the beneficiaries to recognize and appreciate reconstruction efforts. These audits should include financial and technical audits. The monitoring and evaluation tasks should be given an independent consultant so that the technical experts do not comprise this exercise with the day-to-day project management and supervision. During the execution of the project, PMU maintained public relations by informing the beneficiaries about the work progress. This should be adapted to all disaster reconstruction projects since it gives hope to the affected society and help them in planning of their economic activities. The information delivered to the beneficiaries was more important since the public was disillusioned by the pace of the works despite satisfactory efforts that were being undertaken by the PMU. This was because the societies were pressed with damaged transport system, water supplies and health facilities which required hasty rehabilitation.

CONCLUSION

Although various government have varying procurement procedures, the model that was used in El Nino projects in Kenya, is highly adaptable, through adjustment of existing institutional processes such as procurements, projects implementation and management. It enable utilization of existing personnel within the disaster area by breaking down tasks to different levels with lean top management of experienced professionals in different areas. The delegation of duties to lower level of management ensures group participation, thorough identification and resolution of the problems and thus high quality works. This also ensures belongingness of the executed projects hence accountability and eventual sustainability.

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Table 1: Projects Selection Criteria

There were four main categories of design consideration which were critical during the preparation stage of the El Nino emergency Project as outlined in the table below.

No.	***Category of Design Consideration***	***Main Actors***	***Output***
1.	Geographic focus for the possible relief and rehabilitation	Multisectoral specialists (El Nino Disaster Committee) from the ministries of Roads and Public Works, Environment and Natural Resources, Health, Local Government, Finance and Planning and the Office of the President (OP).; District Commissioners, (DDC); the World Bank; and AfDF.	The El Nino Disaster Committee carried out damage assessment caused by the rains and reported that 23 of the sixty districts and Provincial city of Nairobi warranty priority emergency operations; Initial planning for emergency operation in areas most critically impacted by flooding; maintenance of constant liaison between the El Nino Disaster Committee and with the District Disaster Committees (DDC) and District Commissioners; Appraisal and negotiations mission between the World Bank and GoK and AfDF and GoK; Broadening of selection criteria and additional 12 districts found to be eligible for emergency assistance, bringing a total to 35 districts and the Province of Nairobi.
2.	Identification criteria and process for selecting beneficiaries	District Commissioners; District Officers with responsibilities for health, food relief, roads, bridges, water supply, and transport and communication; District Disaster Committees (DDC);	Setting up District Disaster Committees; establishment of high priority needs (food and drug supplies); distribution of drugs in cu-off areas; establishment of facilities that required immediate restoration; prioritization of each district projects and targeting of beneficiaries based on: life saving interventions, restoration of essential services, restoration of economic activities, and saving of existing assets; budget allocation based on population density and severity of damage
3.	Critical sectors for intervention	DDC, IDA, GoK	Identification of priority sectors of intervention requiring rehabilitation and repairs: rural and urban roads, health facilities, and restoration of water supply services. Presented by DDC to Office of the President (OP), and by OP to IDA for urgent financing.

4.	Institutional arrangements for the management of emergency services	GoK - OP, World Bank	Negotiations that led to acceptance of financing El Nino Emergency Project even though Kenya was in a low case-lending scenario by the World Bank due governance and corruption issues; device of ways to direct credit towards assisting only those potential beneficiaries worst affected by the El Nino storm events and how intervention measures will be best operationalized; change of initial GoK proposal of having separate management units by sectoral ministries to the more efficient and quick way of using skilled and experienced project management specialists from the private sector; A greed on management of the project fairly autonomous from GoK entity within (OP); recruitment of officers from private sector with extensive experience to fill the management positions; agreement on secondment of the technical staff from line ministries to manage the projects; full management of ENEP was under control of PMU from May, 1998.

Table 3: Responsibilities of Various Authorities During ENEP

No.	***Authority***	***Responsibility***
1	Project steering committee (PSC), Comprised of: the Permanent Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of Public Service (Chairman), Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President (Alternative Chairman); Permanent Secretaries for participating ministries: OP/Relief and Rehabilitation, OP/Provincial administration, OP/Development coordination, Local Authorities, Public Works and Housing, Water Resources Development, Health and Finance; PMU Project	1. Provide overall policy and ensure the projects' objectives are achieved, in conformity with an agreed Manual of Procedures (MoP). 2. Identify and take action on the institutional requirements for the projects in terms of physical facilities, equipments and staff, and staff recruitment. 3. Approve project plan of operations, budgets and other activities presented for funding. 4. Award contracts based on procurement guidelines stipulated in MoP. 5. Supervise project implementation at all levels. 6. Report to the participating donors on the project activities.

	Manager (Secretary); Technical advisor procurement and engineering services, and Finance and management advisor.	
2.	Project Management Unit (PMU), headed by the Project Manager who was regarded as the team leader of the PMU, together with the Procurement and engineering and Finance Controller, were from the private sector; supported by technical staff from the Public Service Commission.	1. Manage the projects' activities: responsible to the Projects Steering Committee (PSC) on the day-to-day operations of the Special Fund including: 2. Receiving and analyzing demands for funding for sub-projects/activities resulting from El Nino floods. 3. Preparing sub-projects, overall project and operating budget for the projects and recommending sub-projects for PSC approval. 4. Preparing bidding documents, calling for evaluation of bids and issuing letters of award. 5. Supervising consultants and contractors and making payments to them. 6. Ensuring that independent technical and financial audits are carried out.
	Project manager	1. Secretary to the PSC and head of PMU 2. Plan, direct, control and coordinate project activities against the broad policies laid down by the PSC, as well as against specific project targets, processes and goals. 3. Reporting to the PSC on daily operations of the project. 4. Oversee the project activities against the laid down guidelines including implementation of management, financial and technical audits. 5. Monitor projects impacts, lessons learnt and budgetary trends. 6. Ensure that there is structured and consistent monitoring of progress of implementation, including the regular reports as outlined in the Plan of Operation 7. Assign and monitor performance of technical consultants in accordance to the agreed contractual obligations.
	Procurement and engineering advisor, and Finance and management advisor; and Seconded staff from Public Service Commission	1. Answerable to the Project Manager for technical inputs into identification, evaluation and prioritization of all sub-projects, and prequalification of contractors to implement the works. 2. Monitor the performance of the Technical Units (TU) and the contractors, and to draw any matters of concern to the attention of the Project Manager. 3. Liaise with the respective District implementation teams and relevant authorities, to help ensure project objectives are being adhered to, through witnessing the taking-over of each sub-project Works on completion. 4. Verify progress reports, extent to which objectives are being realized; with option of

		forwarding any particular report to the PSC when teemed appropriate.
	Technical Units	This included : 1. Private engineering consultants responsible to the PMU for sub-project assessment and review of submitted priorities, undertake detailed design of rehabilitation or reconstruction works, develop tender documents, support PMU in tender evaluation and supervise contractors from mobilization to completion including defect liability period. 2. Management and financial auditing consultants responsible for identifying shortcomings which were rectified during implementation.
3.	District Disaster Committee (DDC) for the each district included in the emergency project. Membership from governmental and non-governmental organization on equal basis.	Chaired by the District Commissioner and constituting technical officers from line Ministries at district level. Received budgetary envelop to enable DDC prioritize their proposal which were forwarded to the PMU for further review. 1. Responsible for close monitoring of projects in their respective areas on regular basis. 2. Assist in identification, and prioritization of sub-projects/activities
4.	Community Committee	Formed as a component of projects monitoring, project identification and planning, took a stake individually or as community committees on the project. Provided their proposal to the DDC.

Table 3: Summary of the performance indicators and the achievements of the projects implemented under ENEP

No.	***Indicator/ Matrix***	***Actual/Latest Estimate***
1.	Economic activity restored in 23 impacted districts and the province of Nairobi through the restoration of potable water supply	1. Implementation of 33 water supply contracts 2. Rehabilitation of 45 water supply systems and 1 sewerage system
2.	Increased accessibility through restoration/improvement of roads in the non-urban areas	1. Implementation of 23 rural roads and bridges contracts. 2. Rehabilitation and reconstruction of 1,634 km of gravel roads and numerous culverts, drifts and bridges.
3.	Minimize the loss of human life through restoration of health facilities	1. Implementation of 54 health facilities contracts. 2. Rehabilitation of 112 health facilities.
4.	Increased accessibility through restoration/improvement of roads in urban areas	1. Implementation of 8 urban roads contracts. 2. Rehabilitation of 67 km of bitumen roads in six urban centres.